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That remittances are a stable source of external finance 
seems to have become the received wisdom. In addition, 
many studies have found remittances to behave counter-
cyclically, increasing during crises and times of hardship 
for the recipient countries. Are remittances reliable 
macroeconomic stabilizers? To answer this question, 
the present study examines the stability, cyclicality, 
and stabilizing impact of remittances in comparison 
with the same three features for other foreign-exchange 
inflows, namely foreign direct investment and official 
development aid. The analysis is performed at the 
country and regional levels rather than at the aggregate 
or global level (on which much of the received wisdom 
rests), because policymakers are concerned with the 
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department to research determinants and implications of migration. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the 
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impact of remittances in their country rather than at 
the global level. The main findings for 1980-2007 are 
that in a majority of countries: i) official development 
aid is more stable than remittances, and remittances are 
more stable than foreign direct investment; ii) official 
development aid is counter-cyclical, while remittances 
are pro-cyclical, although less so than foreign direct 
investment; and iii) official development aid is stabilizing 
and remittances are destabilizing, although less so than 
foreign direct investment. The paper suggests that it is 
necessary to examine counter-cyclicality separately from 
the stabilizing impact, as the former does not seem to 
always imply the latter.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Global remittance flows to developing countries have experienced accelerated growth since the 
early 1990s, increasing from less than $50 billion around 1990 to a whopping $328 billion in 
2008 (Ratha et al, 2009). Statistics by country indicate India, China, and Mexico as the largest 
recipients of money from migrants abroad. In contrast, Tajikistan, Tonga and Moldova, and other 
small states lead in terms of the share of remittances in GDP. Among factors considered to have 
triggered this rapid growth are the increase in international migration, the cost reductions as well 
as convenience of transferring money through formal channels, and the better measurement and 
reporting of remittances in the Balance of Payments statistics.   
 
The evolution of remittances flows prompted researchers to evaluate their role as an external 
foreign exchange inflow and their ability to neutralize macroeconomic shocks and reduce output 
volatility. We add to this literature by examining the remittances’ (REM’s) stability, cyclicality 
and stabilizing impact, in comparison to the same three features of two other external inflows, 
namely foreign direct investment (FDI), and official development aid (ODA). Our methodology 
relies on coefficients of variation to assess the stability and stabilizing impact, whereas cyclicality 
is evaluated using correlations between GDP on the one hand and the original measures as well as 
the cyclical components of REM, FDI and ODA on the other. 
 
The analysis covers 116 countries over the period 1980-2007 and reveals that ODA is more stable 
than REM in 73% of the countries examined and REM more stable than FDI in 72% of them.  
The coefficients of variation (CV) for 1980-2007 averaged over the sample countries confirm that 
ODA is the most stable (CV = .47), followed by REM (.75) and FDI (1.47). In terms of 
cyclicality, the results indicate that REM is pro-cyclical, FDI more pro-cyclical, and ODA 
counter-cyclical. Finally, ODA has a stabilizing impact in 56% of the countries examined, while 
REM and FDI are destabilizing or have no effect in most of the countries (around 80% and 90%, 
respectively).  
 
Our strategy of comparing the behavior of remittances and other capital flows has been 
previously employed by other studies in the literature (Ratha, 2003, IMF 2005, Lueth and Ruiz-
Arranz, 2007). The motivation for this approach relates to the fact that, as explained in Frankel 
(2009), capital flows are in theory expected to deliver the benefits of smoothing, diversification,   3
financing high-return investment opportunities, and disciplining policies. However, they have 
been shown to typically fail at fulfilling these expectations. It is, thus important to check the 
extent to which alternative sources of foreign exchange such as remittances and ODA are, in 
contrast to private flows, more reliable macroeconomic tool in the hands of policymakers. We 
aim to improve on previous comparisons of these capital inflows by providing a description of 
their behavior according to additional measures to those used in prior studies.  
 
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we conduct the analysis at the country-level, 
for a large number of countries and a wide time-frame. This is because some of the conventional 
wisdom on the stability of remittances both absolute and relative to ODA and FDI is based on 
aggregate (global) data even though policymakers are typically concerned with the behavior of 
these flows at their own country level. Furthermore, most empirical work focusing on the 
macroeconomic impact of remittances typically constrains the estimated effects to be the same for 
all countries in the sample.
1 Second, we treat stability, cyclicality and stabilizing impact 
separately, while most previous literature has typically equated counter-cyclicality with 
stabilizing impact. As elaborated in Section 2.3 and shown in Section 4, the former measure 
implies the latter one for most countries, but not necessarily for all. Although some studies have 
examined the stabilizing impact distinctly from counter-cyclicality, by estimating the impact of 
remittances on the variability of GDP (or GDP growth),
2 they tended to do so by imposing an 
identical relationship between these variables for all countries. In contrast, our methodology 
allows us to identify the behavior of the various foreign capital inflows separately for each 
country.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews prior literature, Section 3 describes the data, 
Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Selected Literature Review 
 
Section 2.1 describes studies that examine the behavior of stability of remittances and other 
external inflows. Section 2.2 reviews research that uses statistical methods to analyze cyclicality 
of remittances in relation to output volatility. Finally, Section 2.3 discusses how the issue of 
stabilization has been approached hitherto in the literature.  
 
                                                 
1 One exception is Chami et al. (2005), who run regressions at country level.  




Ratha (2003) was the first to point out the recent remarkable ascending path of global remittances 
compared to the evolution of other sources of external financing, namely foreign direct 
investment (FDI), capital non-FDI flows and official development aid (ODA). Moreover, the 
study found remittances to be more stable than ODA and FDI and much more so than the pro-
cyclical non-FDI capital inflows. This latter finding was confirmed by subsequent research 
including Buch and Kuckulenz (2004) and IMF (2005).  
 
While previous analyses of stability typically focused on global external inflows, our paper 
examines the issue at the country-specific level, relying on as many individual countries as we 
could find data for.   
2.2. Cyclicality 
 
The claims of large size and relative stability of remittances flows elicited the interest of 
researchers and policy makers alike who became interested in examining remittances’ potential to 
reduce output volatility and absorb macroeconomic shocks. To that goal, many studies attempted 
to determine the behavior of remittances in relation to macroeconomic indicators, more 
particularly whether the former move counter- or pro-cyclically with the latter.  
 
The discussion about cyclicality found a theoretical justification in the literature studying the 
determinants of remittances. There are several theories explaining why migrants remit. The first 
gives prevalence to family ties, considered to favor the sending of remittances through various 
channels, of which an important one is the altruistic motive. The altruistic motive of remitting 
hypothesizes that migrants help relatives and friends back home out of care considerations, 
without envisioning a pecuniary or alternative material interest. In other words, the welfare of 
distant relatives and friends is a component of migrants’ own utility function (Rapoport and 
Docquier, 2006, Niimi et al, 2008). Under this assumption, remittances are expected to behave 
counter-cyclically, with migrants remitting more during times of economic hardship in the origin 
countries. The second, more recent theory holds that migrants optimize placement of their savings 
between origin and destination countries.  Hence, remitting money is a form of investment. This 
theory is broadly called “the portfolio” approach and its prediction is that remittances display a   5
pro-cyclical trend relative to macroeconomic indicators and private capital flows. Most empirical 
studies focusing on the causes of remittances have found prevalent evidence for the altruist 
motive as opposed to the portfolio one. See Elbadawi and Rocha (1992) for a detailed review, and 
Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) as a more recent contribution. 
 
Support for the importance of the altruist motive in remitting is also widespread in the literature 
studying the response of remittances in the aftermath of disruptive events such as natural 
disasters, political conflicts or specific economic crises. Thus, Clarke and Wallsten (2004) find 
that remittance inflows increased following a natural disaster in Jamaica. Gupta (2004) obtains a 
positive impact of an Indian drought on the cyclical component of remittances received by the 
country. Ratha (2006) indicates that remittance inflows increased after natural disasters in 
Bangladesh, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Honduras, as well as in response to conflicts in 
Albania and in Sierra Leone. They remained substantial during conflict in Ivory Coast (Black et 
al, 2004). Yang (2008) also finds an increase in remittances following natural disasters. A similar 
result is suggested by Joseph and Mohapatra (2009) in an ongoing work utilizing data for a large 
set of developing and high-income countries during 1970-2006. Hysenbegasi and Pozo (2002) 
find sharp increase in remittances after large macroeconomic shocks and currency crises in the 
Latin American and Caribbean countries. Yang and Choi (2007) employ household level data for 
the Philippines and find that in households with overseas migrants, exogenous changes in income 
lead to changes in remittances of the opposite sign. Halliday (2006) shows that adverse 
agricultural conditions increased remittances inflows in El Salvador.  
 
On the other hand, Lueth & Ruiz-Arranz (2006) obtain that for the eleven countries in their 
analysis remittances do not seem to increase in the wake of natural disasters. In the same line, 
Ratha (2003) mentions that remittance receipts declined in Turkey and the Philippines after the 
financial crises that hit the countries in the late 1990s, although the decline was less than that of 
other capital inflows. This evidence prompted Ratha (2003) to assert that the response of 
remittances to dramatic changes in economic activity was unclear. 
 
As for the empirical literature examining the cyclicality direction of remittances in relation to 
macroeconomic indicators, the conclusions are mixed. In support to the counter-cyclical response, 
Mishra (2005) finds for 13 Caribbean countries that a 1 percent decrease in real GDP leads to a 3 
percent increase in remittances two years later. Similarly, Bouhga-Hagbe (2004) shows that 
remittances to Morocco are, over the long run, negatively correlated with real GDP in Morocco.    6
El Sakka and McNabb (1999) find that remittances to Egypt increase with country’s inflation. In 
a panel specification including 113 countries and up to 29 years, Chami et al. (2005) obtain that 
remittances to GDP are negatively correlated with the GDP growth.   
 
Examining the determinants of remittances using a panel of 101 countries during 1970-2003, IMF 
(2005) finds a significant negative impact of home country output on remittances. Nevertheless, 
the study’s analysis of the correlations between aggregate remittances and other inflows on the 
one hand, and GDP on the other indicates that remittances are positively correlated with GDP, 
although they are not as sharply procyclical as the non-FDI capital inflows.   
 
Acosta et al (2008) examine the correlation between the cyclical components of remittances and 
real output in recipient countries for 26 Latin American countries and find evidence of counter-
cyclicality even after controlling for the endogeneity of output fluctuations. Extension of the 
analysis to other developing countries leads to the same result, but also reveals great 
heterogeneity by country group in the sensitivity of remittances to oscillations in the real output.  
The aggregated de-trended remittances sent to the 12 countries examined in Sayan (2006) are also 
negatively correlated with de-trended GDP. Nevertheless, both Acosta et al (2008) and Sayan 
(2006) find that the correlations at country-specific level weaken the verdict of counter-cyclicality 
obtained from the aggregate level analyses. Thus, several countries in the samples of each study 
exhibit pro- rather than counter-cyclical remittances in relation to output. This result prompts 
Sayan (2006) to conclude that “counter-cyclicality is hard to generalize to all countries.” 
 
 Representing the literature which gives preference to the “portfolio” approach in remitting, Lueth 
and Ruiz-Arranz (2006) conclude that remittances are aligned with the business cycle in the 
recipient country. Their analysis is based on estimating a gravity model of the determinants of 
remittances in 11 countries. Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2007) employ time series data and a vector 
error correction model to find that remittances to Sri Lanka are pro-cyclical. In addition, the study 
compares remittances with other external flows and obtains a negative correlation between ODA 
and GDP, as well as positive correlations between remittances (private capital flows) and GDP.  
Finally, Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2005) show that remittances are more pro-cyclical in 
countries with shallower financial systems.   
   7
Our study finds that at the country specific level counter-cyclicality of remittances is observed 
less often than pro-cyclicality, suggesting that, for the majority of the large number of countries 
examined, the portfolio motive of remitting is stronger than the altruist one.  
2.3. Stabilization  
 
The general perception arising from the literature that evaluates the cyclicality of remittances 
seems to be that counter-cyclicality automatically implies the ability to buffer macroeconomic 
shocks. Thus, Sayan (2006) states that the “countercyclicality enables remittances to serve as a 
stabilizer that helps smooth out large fluctuations,” while “in the case of procyclicality, 
remittances may act as a destabilizing force since this would increase the capacity of swings in 
remittance flows to produce additional fluctuations in output or current account balances, with 
serious macroeconomic effects.” In the same line, Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2006) conclude that 
remittances may not play a major role in limiting vulnerability to shocks, because they are found 
to be aligned with the business cycle in the home country.  
 
One skeptical voice is that of Chami et al (2005) who despite finding remittances to be counter-
cyclical question their role as a tool for economic development, because of what they consider the 
moral hazard accompanying the process of remitting money. This would be caused by the 
asymmetric altruism leading to free riding of remittance recipient on senders’ good will. In other 
words, recipients tend to work less when relying on money from abroad.
3   
 
IMF (2005) and Acosta et al (2008) go one step further and examine empirically the direct impact 
of remittances on output growth volatility. The former study finds that “a 2.5 percentage point 
increase in the remittances/GDP ratio is on average associated with a one-sixth decline in 
aggregate output volatility.” In turn, Acosta et al (2008) obtain that “countries with larger 
remittances flows (as a percentage of GDP) tend to have less volatile real output fluctuations,” 
with one standard deviation increase in remittances reducing the standard deviation of growth in 
real output per capita by more than 10 percent. 
 
                                                 
3 However, the fact that they work less in response to remittances need not indicate the presence of moral 
hazard.  It may simply be an optimal response of recipients since the demand for leisure tends to rise with 
income.  A problem would arise if recipients behaved strategically and worked less in order to obtain more 
remittances from those who migrated.   8
An interesting finding, by Bugamelli and Paternò (2005), is that remittances tend to help 
countries obtain access to foreign capital flows and therefore prevent them from having to 
implement drastic Current Account reversals. Such an impact might be more likely to be captured 
by econometric estimation than by our analysis.     
 
Our study finds that remittances are not stabilizing for the majority of analyzed countries. Though 
the results should be of much interest to policymakers and analysts, it is clear that further work is 
needed and additional empirical analysis is on our research agenda. Our study also points out the 
necessity to consider the issues of cyclicality and stabilization separately. While the two features 
seem to indeed go together in most cases, the several instances when this is not true suggest that 
counter-cyclicality does not necessarily trigger stabilization.  
 
We say that a capital inflow X (X = ODA, FDI or remittances R) is stabilizing (destabilizing) if 
the coefficient of variation of (GDP + X) is smaller (larger) than that of GDP, i.e., if 
. Since  ,  
it follows that  .  
 
Thus, the fact that X is counter-cyclical, i.e., that  does not ensure that 
 or that  . Whether X is actually 
stabilizing or not will depend on the level of both   and the average value of (X/GDP), 
denoted here by χ. If   is large and χ is small, X might be counter-cyclical and 
destabilizing at the same time.  
 
A possible though less likely scenario is for X to be pro-cyclical as well as stabilizing. In this 
case,  , and since   > 0, it follows that  . 
Nevertheless, it is possible for X to be stabilizing, i.e., for  
  to be smaller than  
 (where “SD” stands for “standard deviation”, and the upper bars above the 
denominators denote the mean values). A necessary condition for that to occur is for χ to be 
sufficiently large so that the ratio [GDP+X)/GDP] is larger than  ) ( / ) ( GDP SD X GDP SD  .  This   9
would only likely to be the case for countries that are small and poor and thus have low GDPs 
and are very open to migration and recipients of large amounts of remittances.    
 
In summary, the cyclicality of remittances may indicate whether altruism or self-interest is the 
dominant motive in a particular country. It will also indicate whether remittances are stabilizing 
or not in most cases, though certainly not in all of them. Counter-cyclical remittances (or other 
sources of capital inflows) may be destabilizing, and vice versa, though the latter would seem to 




We employ the following indicators: Remittances, Foreign Direct Investment or FDI (net 
inflows), Official Development Aid (ODA), and GDP. Remittances are defined as the sum of 
three series from the IMF Balance of Payments: workers’ remittances, migrants’ transfers and 
compensation of employees.  All the other data come from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI). The FDI, originally reported by the IMF Balance of Payments 
Statistics as “Direct Investment in reporting country”, is comprised of equity capital, reinvested 
earnings and other claims/liabilities on/to direct investors.  Variables are expressed in US million 
dollars. Remittances, ODA and FDI are converted from current US dollars into constant 2000 US 
dollars by using the US GDP deflator.  
 
Our sample includes 116 developing countries of which 36 are low income, 45 lower middle 
income and 35 upper middle income. By geographical criterion, 15 countries are from East Asia 
and Pacific (EAP), 20 from Europe and Central Asia (ECA), 28 from Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC), 10 from Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 6 from South Asia (SA), and 
37 from Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Appendix Table A1 lists the names of the countries and the 
classifications by income group and by regions. 
 
Remittance data for some individual countries are incomplete. Sixty-four of the 116 countries 
taken into consideration have values for 20 or more years (with an average of 910 million   10
constant US dollars), 39 report data for 10 to 19 years, while 13 for less than 9 data points.  
Remittances are available in all years for 34 countries
4.  
 
Table 1 presents general statistics related to the shares of REM, FDI and ODA in GDP. Panel a 
includes means, medians, standard deviations, and the maximum values for all countries and 
years pooled together, while panel b lists the same for country averages (across years).  Both 
panels reveal that ODA is more important than REM as a share of GDP. On the other hand REM 
represents a larger share of GDP compared to FDI. The series have a large dispersion as shown 
by the magnitude of standard deviations relative to that of the means. Furthermore, while the 
minimum values of all three series are close to zero and the means do not exceed 9.7%, the 
maximum values are much higher, ranging from 86.24% for FDI to 94.18% for REM in panel a, 
and from 14.57% for FDI to 79.43% for ODA in panel b. The differences between means and 
medians reveal that the distributions of the three shares are skewed to the left, with REM 




In order to evaluate the stability of remittances, ODA and FDI, coefficients of variation covering 
the period 1980-2007 are calculated for each indicator by country.
5 Additionally, these 
coefficients of variation are averaged with and without weights across all countries in the sample 
as well as for separate geographic regions and income level groups. 
 
The averages of the coefficients of variation for various aggregates are presented in Table 2.  
Panels a and b indicate that across the 116 developing countries and regardless of whether the 
averages are simple or GDP-weighted, ODA is the most stable of all the inflows (with CV of 0.47 
in panel a, and 0.55 in panel b), followed by REM (0.75 in panel a, and 0.94 in panel b), and FDI 
(1.47 in panel a, and 1.12 in panel b). This pattern is robust to aggregations by region as well as 
income groups, with the exception of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) for which REM 
is more stable than the ODA (CV of REM is 0.31 in both panels, while CV of ODA is 0.54 in 
                                                 
4 Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Egypt, Arab Rep., El Salvador, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Lesotho, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, 
Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, Sudan, Swaziland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey. 
5 Tables with coefficients of variation by country are available from the authors upon request.   11
both panels). The reverse in importance for MENA is not due to the ODA, the stability of which 
lies in the range reported for other geographical areas, but to REM instead, with its CV well 
below the average for any of the groups considered. Looking closer into this issue we find eight 
of the ten MENA countries in the analysis to experience more stable REM than ODA during the 
period analyzed (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Djibouti and Yemen). The 
exceptions are Tunisia and Algeria. 
 
Panel b indicates East Asia and Pacific and the lower middle income countries as having the most 
volatile remittances (CV=1.36 and 1.12, respectively). This outcome is related to a member of 
both groups, namely China, which has a high REM volatility (CV=1.57), but also the highest 
income relative to the other EAP and lower middle income countries.  
 
Finally, as revealed by both panels, FDI’s stability increases with income. On the other hand, the 
stability of ODA decreases with countries’ income in panel a. This pattern would be observed in 
panel b as well if it were not for Nigeria, the relative economic importance and high CV of which 
push up the weighted average of the low income group from 0.38 in panel a to 0.66 in panel b. 
Nigeria’s CV for ODA amounts to 2.37. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the country-level situation by presenting the percentage of countries for 
which a particular inflow (series A) is more stable– i.e. has a lower coefficient of variation - than 
another inflow (series B).  REM is more stable than ODA in only 27% of the 116 developing 
countries, but is more stable than FDI in 72% of the countries.  ODA is overwhelmingly more 
stable than FDI (in 91% of cases) and REM (in 73% of cases).  Thus, the order suggested by 
Table 2 holds here as well: the ranking of stability from the most to the least stable is ODA-REM-
FDI.  The pattern is confirmed for all income-level groups as well as for all geographical regions 
except MENA. The most MENA countries considered in this study experienced more stable REM 
than ODA during the analyzed period. 
4.2. Cyclicality  
 
If remittances are predominantly driven by altruistic motives, it can be expected that migrants 
send more money during periods of economic slowdown characterized by declining GDP. To 
investigate the counter-cyclicality of remittances vis-à-vis GDP, correlations between GDP on the 
one hand, and REM, ODA and FDI on the other, are calculated for each country, and - as in the 
previous section - at aggregate level and for geographical and income-level groups. We present   12
results using both the original indicators (in conformity with the methodology employed in the 
sections about stability and stabilizing impact) and de-trended ones (which is the norm in the 
literature examining cyclicality). As an additional exercise, the tables also include correlations 
between GDP and the sum of all 3 indicators, REM+ODA+FDI. Correlations between GDP and 
the sum of two of the three indicators (REM+ODA, REM+FDI, ODA+FDI) are provided in 
Appendix Tables A2 through A5.  
 
Table 4 is based on original (non de-trended) indicators and reports the coefficients of correlation 
for various country aggregations. ODA is negatively correlated with GDP for most groups in 
panel a, based on simple averages, but also for most groups of panel b where the economic size of 
countries is taken into account. The correlation between GDP and ODA across all developing 
countries is negative but quite small in both panels (a: -0.02; b: -0.20). South Asian countries 
have larger negative coefficients relative to the other groups:  -0.28 in panel a, and -0.67 in panel 
b). The coefficient for Europe and Central Asia, although positive (0.14) in panel a, becomes -
0.23 in panel b, indicating a stronger negative correlation between GDP and ODA for countries 
with higher GDP. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, the presence of many countries with positive 
correlation between ODA and GDP is mirrored by the positive correlation coefficient of 0.13 in 
panel a. The even higher value in panel b, namely 0.56, is due to high coefficients coupled with 
relative economic importance of countries such as South Africa (0.72) and Nigeria (0.58).   
Nigeria also contributes to the positive coefficient of the low income group in panel b (0.10). 
 
Remittances are mostly positively correlated with GDP, and the coefficients vary widely in size 
not only by group but also by method of calculation. The unweighted figure for all the 116 
developing countries is 0.50, but accounting for the economic size changes the average to 0.66, 
reflecting the higher correlation coefficients in the larger economies and suggesting that the 
portfolio or investment motive is stronger in larger than in smaller countries. Most groups have 
positive correlation coefficients that exceed 0.50 in both panels. For Europe and Central Asia the 
0.67 coefficient in panel a declines to 0.12 after weighting because of countries with low or 
negative correlations and high GDP such as Russia, Belarus and Turkey. Similarly, the 
unweighted positive correlation coefficient for MENA (0.32 in panel a) becomes 0.12 in panel b 
due to Algeria (-0.85), Yemen (-0.42) or Egypt (-0.27). Presence of Algeria in the group also 
reduces correlation coefficients in panel b as opposed to panel a, for FDI, ODA and to the highest 
degree for REM+FDI+ODA. As indicated in Table A2, panel b, a similar pattern is observed for 
the correlations with GDP of REM+FDI, REM+ODA and FDI+ODA. Correlation between REM   13
and GDP is significantly higher in the weighted scenario than the unweighted one for Sub-
Saharan Africa (because of Nigeria, with correlation coefficient of 0.71, and South Africa, with 
correlation coefficient of 0.97).  
 
In general, Table 4 reveals that with few exceptions REM has smaller positive correlations with 
GDP compared to FDI. In conclusion, while ODA behaves consistently counter-cyclically, REM 
and FDI are pro-cyclical, with FDI more so than REM. The analysis to this point reveals that of 
the three inflows, ODA is the most susceptible to help buffer economic crises. While it is not 
surprising that FDI is positively related to GDP, the finding of pro-cyclicality for REM would 
seem to imply that the portfolio or investment motive for remitting dominates the altruistic 
motive.  
 
The share of countries with the non-de-trended indicators of interest negatively correlated with 
GDP is provided in Table 5.
6 On the one hand, 54% of countries have countercyclical ODA 
(between 33 and 80% in the various groups). On the other, more than 50% of them display a pro-
cyclical pattern for REM and FDI. Overall, FDI flows are pro-cyclical for a larger number of 
countries compared to REM and ODA. Thus, 11% of countries have negative correlations 
between FDI and GDP, compared to 21% for REM, and 54% for ODA. At group level, this order 
in magnitude is reversed only for FDI and REM in the case of East Asia and the Pacific.  
 
Both Tables 4 and 5 indicate that REM and FDI are more pro (ODA is more counter) -cyclical in 
the lower and upper middle income groups than in the low income group.
7 Thus, the correlation 
coefficient between FDI and GDP is about 0.60 for both lower and upper middle group countries 
in panel a of Table 4, while the figure for low income countries is 0.40. The same ranking, 
although with different magnitudes, is apparent in panel b. Likewise, as shown in Table 5, 94% of 
the upper middle income countries have pro-cyclical FDI as opposed to 81% of the low income 
ones. The correlation coefficient between REM and GDP is 0.33 in panel a, and 0.43 in panel b 
for low income countries, but reaches 0.58 (0.77) for lower middle income countries in panels a 
(b). On the other hand, 67% (60%) of the lower (upper) middle income countries have counter-
cyclical ODA, as opposed to 33% of the low income ones.  
                                                 
6 Indices of correlation by country are available from the authors upon request. 
7 With respect to remittances, this finding is in contrast to Acosta et al (2008)  who obtain that “at least 
among developing countries, the countercyclicality of remittances appears to increase with income, being 
highest among upper-middle-income countries.”    14
Finally, comparison of the last columns in Table 4 to Appendix Table A2, as well as of the last 
column in table 5 to Appendix Table A3, reveals that adding ODA to REM+FDI reduces the 
pro-cyclicality of these inflows, while adding REM to FDI+ODA and adding FDI to 
REM+ODA increases pro-cyclicality in most cases. 
 
Since the majority of studies focusing on the correlation between GDP and remittances examine 
only the relationship between the cyclical components of the indicators, we present equivalents of 
Tables 4 and 5 using variables de-trended based on Hodrick-Prescott’s method. Table 6 (A4)  is 
the counterpart of Table 4 (A2) in that it presents the coefficients of correlation aggregated by 
regions and groups, while Table 7 (A5)  mirrors Table 5 (A3) by indicating the percentage of 
countries for which de-trended flow A is counter-cyclical.  
  
The results in Tables 6 and 7 weaken, but do not invalidate the conclusions reached using the 
analysis of the non-detrended indicators. Thus, the coefficients of correlation presented in Table 6 
are closer to zero than the ones in Table 4, suggesting a lack of strong link for all inflows and 
within most groups considered. While REM and FDI are pro-cyclical in the majority of cases (the 
percentages of countries with counter-cyclical REM or FDI are less than 50% in Table 7), ODA’s 
counter-cyclicality is much less obvious in both Table 6, where most coefficients reported by 
panel b are positive, and in Table 7, where the percentage of countries with counter-cyclical 
ODA, although still higher than that of REM and FDI, is most often below 50%. FDI is pro-
cyclical in still a greater number of countries than REM for most groups considered (exceptions 
as per Table 7: East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia and the lower middle income 
countries). As a general result, ODA is counter-cyclical in 43% of all developing countries, REM 
in 35% of them  meaning it is pro-cyclical in 65%) - while FDI is counter(pro)-cyclical in   
31%(69%).   
 
Although in a weakened version, the conclusions according to which REM and FDI are more pro 
(ODA is more counter)-cyclical in the lower and upper middle income groups than in the low 
income group hold in the analysis based on de-trended indicators as well.  Likewise, adding ODA 
to REM+FDI (REM to FDI+ODA and FDI to REM+ODA) is found to reduce (increase) pro-
cyclicality of the flows (as shown in Tables A4/A5).  
   15
4.3. Stabilizing Impact 
 
We examine now whether or not the various capital flows are stabilizing. This differs from 
cyclicality which looks at the relationship between annual changes in GDP and annual changes in 
these flows, while stabilization looks at the impact of these flows on stability over the entire 
period. Table 8 presents the shares of countries for which REM, FDI, ODA and REM+FDI+ODA 
help decrease the variability of GDP measured by the coefficient of variation. Appendix Table A6 
provides the stabilizing impact of REM+FDI, REM+ODA and FDI+ODA.  
 
The results depict ODA as the most stabilizing of the three inflows (stabilizing GDP in 56% of 
the countries), followed by REM (20%) and FDI (11%). The situation is similar for the various 
groups examined. With respect to the “marginal” stabilizing impact, we observe that adding ODA 
to REM+FDI increases the stabilizing impact of these inflows, i.e. ODA+REM+FDI is more 
stabilizing than REM+FDI, while adding REM to FDI+ODA and adding FDI to REM+ODA 
decreases it. In fact, ODA+REM+FDI is stabilizing in close to twice as many countries as 
REM+FDI (30% vs. 19%).  Interestingly, the stabilizing impact of both REM and ODA decreases 
with income (ranging from 25% and 61% for the low income countries to 11% and 43% for the 
upper middle income ones).  
 
Together with the findings in Tables 5 and 7, it appears that ODA is both counter-cyclical and 
stabilizing, REM is mostly pro-cyclical and destabilizing, while FDI is more pro-cyclical and 
more destabilizing than REM. 
 
Note that it is possible for the CV(X+GDP) to be larger (smaller) than CV(GDP) even if the 
correlation coefficient between X and GDP is < (>) 0 (X=REM, ODA or FDI).
8 This is illustrated 
by the group of lower middle income countries, where pro-cyclicality of REM is more 
widespread than that of FDI (73% of countries for REM as opposed to 69% for FDI as shown by 
Table 7), although REM is more stabilizing than FDI (22% of the countries for REM as opposed 
to 7% for FDI in Table 8).  As another example, ODA is counter-cyclical in one third of the low-
income group countries, but stabilizing in 61% of these countries (i.e. in 85% more countries). 
This dramatic difference suggests the presence of a substantial number of countries where greater 
counter-cyclicality for ODA is not related to a stabilizing impact of ODA. Furthermore, of the 92 
countries that have pro-cyclical REM (with cyclicality being assessed based on original 
                                                 
8 For additional theoretical background, see discussion in section 2.3.   16
indicators), a stabilizing effect is still present in 9 of them (or 10%). Additionally, the analysis of 
the de-trended variables indicates no stabilizing effect in 11 of the 41 countries that have a 
counter-cyclical REM.   
 
The stabilizing or destabilizing impact of the various capital inflows may depend not only on 
their stochastic behavior, but also on their share in GDP.
9 Examining the 37 countries with share 
of remittances in GDP higher than the mean value of 5.75 % (Table 1), we find REM and GDP to 
be positively correlated in 29 countries. Of these, REM is destabilizing in 19, has no impact in 6, 
and is stabilizing in 4. In other words, REM is not destabilizing in one third of the countries 
where REM is pro-cyclical. Based on the de-trended variables, the results indicate that among the 
10 countries with counter-cyclical REM, for 5 there is stabilization, for 2 - no effect, and for 3 - a 
de-stabilizing impact. Thus, based on de-trended variables, REM is only stabilizing in 50% of the 
countries where it is counter-cyclical.  
 
Our results about the stabilizing impact of remittances come at odds with the negative and 
significant coefficient of remittances found by IMF (2005) in the regression explaining output 
volatility. However, the volatility definition used in that study consists of the standard deviation 
of output growth, while we define it as the coefficient of variation over the period examined.  
Moreover, the IMF study measures remittances using the remittances/GDP ratio, hence the 
finding of a negative impact might be due to the fact that this ratio would be negatively correlated 
with GDP even in the case where remittances were constant and possibly even if remittances 
were pro-cyclical. On the other hand, we use for each individual country the actual level of 
remittances rather than its ratio to GDP.   
5. Conclusions 
 
That remittances are a stable and growing source of foreign exchange and are more stable than 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development aid (ODA) flows seems to have become 
the received wisdom. To check this and other findings in the previous literature, this study 
investigated the stability, cyclicality and stabilizing impact of remittances, FDI and ODA. Both at 
the country and aggregate levels, it was found that REM is less stable than ODA, but more stable 
than FDI. Second, while ODA is counter-cyclical in 54% of the countries (43% according to 
analysis based on de-trended indicators), remittances and FDI are pro-cyclical in between 80% 
                                                 
9 Acosta et al (2008) show that the inequality-reducing effects of remittances are comparatively larger in 
countries where remittances represent a higher share of income.     17
and 90% of the countries examined (65% and 69% if variables are de-trended). Similarly, ODA is 
stabilizing in a majority of countries, while REM is destabilizing or has no effect in more than 
three-quarters of the countries and FDI in close to 90% of the countries. In addition, the stability 
of ODA (FDI) decreases (increases) with countries’ income, REM and FDI are more pro (ODA is 
more counter)–cyclical in the lower and upper middle income groups than in the low income 
group, and the stabilizing impact of REM (ODA) increases (falls) with countries’ income.   
Finally, adding ODA to REM+FDI (REM to FDI+ODA, and FDI to REM+ODA) reduces (raises) 
the pro-cyclicality and raises (reduces) the stabilizing impact of these flows. 
 
Though, as documented in a large part of the literature, remittances increase at times of major 
upheavals such as natural disasters, armed conflicts or economic crises in migrants’ source 
countries, we find them to be pro-cyclical as well as destabilizing for a majority of developing 
countries over large periods of times (1980 to 2007 in our analysis). Moreover, adding REM to 
FDI and ODA inflows raises the pro-cyclicality of these inflows as well as their destabilizing 
impact. Our results at this stage convey a cautiousness message, suggesting that the stabilizing 
virtues of remittances inflows be examined on a country-by-country basis. Explaining the patterns 
in the observed behavior of remittances and other inflows requires further empirical examination. 
The objective of this paper was to simply provide evidence on the behavior of remittances, as 
well as ODA and FDI. The examination of the motives underlying it, its determinants or its 
impact is on our research agenda. 
 
It could be argued that there might be a problem with our conclusions being drawn solely based 
on the examination of formal remittance flows, while informal channels are estimated by the 
researchers to still attract about 50% of remittances (Ratha, 2006). However, all studies dealing 
with remittances only use official remittance data because of the lack of data on informal 
remittances. Consequently, the cyclical behavior of informal remittances cannot be ascertained, 
and neither is it possible to know the impact of including informal remittances on our findings. 
This lack of data obviously plagues the findings of all remittance studies.  
 
As a final comment, whether REM flows are pro- or counter-cyclical and stabilizing or not, their 
impact might also depend on their importance relative to GDP and other sources of inflows. 
However, even though REM may be small as a share of GDP, it may amount to a large share of 
the income of recipient households and may therefore have a substantial impact on the stability of 
these households’ income.  This issue will also be studied in future work.    18
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Max Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Max
REM/GDP 2304 5.58 2.13 12.43 94.18 116 5.76 2.67 9.70 79.43
FDI/GDP 2304 3.29 1.79 5.50 86.24 116 3.58 2.61 3.52 14.57
ODA/GDP 2304 8.78 4.57 11.48 93.83 116 9.61 5.61 11.81 76.95
Variables (%)
a. statistics of indicators by country and year b. statistics of country averages
 
 
Table 2. Stability of Capital Flows by Groups: Averages of Country Coefficients of 
Variation, 1980-2007 
a. Simple average 
REM FDI ODA
ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 0.75 1.47 0.47
East Asia and Pacific 0.78 1.49 0.44
Europe and Central Asia 0.82 1.04 0.39
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.90 0.86 0.56
Middle East and North Africa 0.31 1.67 0.54
South Asia 0.58 1.11 0.32
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.75 2.16 0.46
Low income 0.82 1.88 0.38
Lower middle income 0.73 1.35 0.42
Upper middle income 0.72 1.20 0.62  
b. GDP-weighted average 
REM FDI ODA
ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 0.94 1.12 0.55
East Asia and Pacific 1.36 0.98 0.53
Europe and Central Asia 0.64 1.13 0.55
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.93 0.95 0.60
Middle East and North Africa 0.31 1.67 0.54
South Asia 0.67 1.40 0.36
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.87 1.78 0.61
Low income 0.91 1.81 0.66
Lower middle income 1.12 1.16 0.45
Upper middle income 0.79 1.02 0.62    22
Table 3.  Stability: Percentage of Countries with More Stable Inflow A than B*, 1980-2007 
REM REM ODA
ODA FDI FDI
ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 116 27% 72% 91%
East Asia and Pacific 15 13% 67% 87%
Europe and Central Asia 20 20% 60% 95%
Latin America and the Caribbean 28 29% 61% 93%
Middle East and North Africa 10 70% 100% 80%
South Asia 6 17% 83% 83%
Sub-Saharan Africa 37 24% 81% 95%
low income 36 17% 75% 94%
lower middle income 45 20% 73% 93%
upper middle income 35 46% 69% 86%
series A
series B Number of 
countries
 
*Stability measured by CV   23
Table 4. Cyclicality: Averages of Country-Level Correlation Coefficients between Various 
Inflows and GDP, 1980-2007 




ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 0.50 0.52 -0.02 0.52
East Asia and Pacific 0.52 0.50 -0.20 0.46
Europe and Central Asia 0.67 0.64 0.14 0.70
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.68 0.60 -0.11 0.68
Middle East and North Africa 0.32 0.51 -0.17 0.32
South Asia 0.59 0.52 -0.28 0.65
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.30 0.42 0.13 0.35
Low income 0.33 0.40 0.19 0.39
Lower middle income 0.58 0.57 -0.18 0.54
Upper middle income 0.57 0.60 -0.03 0.62  




ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 0.66 0.71 -0.20 0.73
East Asia and Pacific 0.82 0.82 -0.30 0.86
Europe and Central Asia 0.12 0.71 -0.23 0.67
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.83 0.68 -0.12 0.75
Middle East and North Africa 0.12 0.45 -0.20 0.21
South Asia 0.83 0.85 -0.67 0.86
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.72 0.46 0.56 0.51
Low income 0.43 0.62 0.10 0.56
Lower middle income 0.77 0.78 -0.36 0.80
Upper middle income 0.60 0.67 -0.11 0.69    24
Table 5. Cyclicality: Percentage of Countries for which Inflow A is Negatively Correlated 




ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 116 21% 11% 54% 16%
East Asia and Pacific 15 7% 13% 80% 20%
Europe and Central Asia 20 10% 10% 40% 5%
Latin America and the Caribbean 28 7% 4% 64% 4%
Middle East and North Africa 10 40% 10% 70% 30%
South Asia 6 33% 17% 67% 17%
Sub-Saharan Africa 37 35% 16% 38% 24%
low income 36 28% 19% 33% 22%
lower middle income 45 18% 9% 67% 20%







Table 6. Cyclicality: Averages of Country-Level Correlation Coefficients between Various 
Inflows and GDP, 1980-2007, Hodrick-Prescott de-trending 
a. Simple average 
REM FDI ODA REM+FDI+ODA
ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 0.08 0.14 0.00 0.11
East Asia and Pacific 0.13 0.12 -0.05 0.14
Europe and Central Asia 0.25 0.17 0.03 0.18
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.02 0.14 -0.02 0.12
Middle East and North Africa 0.11 0.13 0.02 0.15
South Asia -0.01 0.35 -0.14 -0.21
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.08
Low income -0.01 0.10 0.04 0.03
Lower middle income 0.16 0.16 -0.04 0.11
Upper middle income 0.08 0.14 0.02 0.18  
b. GDP-weighted average 
REM FDI ODA REM+FDI+ODA
ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 0.12 0.29 0.02 0.28
East Asia and Pacific 0.32 0.56 0.00 0.55
Europe and Central Asia 0.36 0.22 0.03 0.27
Latin America and the Caribbean -0.06 0.17 0.06 0.16
Middle East and North Africa 0.11 0.24 0.10 0.26
South Asia -0.03 0.31 -0.04 0.15
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.11 0.05 -0.12 0.08
Low income -0.09 0.06 -0.01 -0.06
Lower middle income 0.23 0.43 0.01 0.41
Upper middle income 0.06 0.20 0.03 0.21  
   26
Table 7. Cyclicality: Percentage of Countries for which Inflow A is Negatively Correlated 
with GDP, 1980-2007, Hodrick-Prescott de-trending 
REM FDI ODA REM+FDI+ODA
ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 116 35% 31% 43% 32%
East Asia and Pacific 15 20% 40% 53% 40%
Europe and Central Asia 20 15% 30% 35% 25%
Latin America and the Caribbean 28 50% 18% 50% 29%
Middle East and North Africa 10 40% 40% 40% 20%
South Asia 6 33% 17% 67% 50%
Sub-Saharan Africa 37 41% 38% 35% 35%
low income 36 44% 36% 33% 39%
lower middle income 45 27% 31% 58% 33%











ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 116 20% 11% 56% 30%
East Asia and Pacific 15 7% 13% 60% 27%
Europe and Central Asia 20 15% 10% 50% 10%
Latin America and the Caribbean 28 7% 4% 46% 11%
Middle East and North Africa 10 50% 0% 60% 50%
South Asia 6 17% 0% 83% 50%
Sub-Saharan Africa 37 30% 22% 59% 49%
low income 36 25% 17% 61% 44%
lower middle income 45 22% 7% 62% 31%





* CV(A)<CV(GDP)   27
APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1. Countries by Region and Income Group 
East Asia and 
Pacific
Europe and Central 
Asia
Latin America and 
the Caribbean
Middle East and 
North Africa South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa
Cambodia Kyrgyz Republic Haiti Yemen, Rep. Bangladesh Benin
Lao PDR Tajikistan Nepal Burkina Faso























China Albania Bolivia Algeria India Cameroon
Indonesia Armenia Colombia Djibouti Maldives Cape Verde
Kiribati Azerbaijan Dominican Rep. Egypt, Arab Rep. Sri Lanka Congo, Rep.
Mongolia
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Ecuador Jordan Lesotho
Philippines Georgia El Salvador Morocco Namibia
Samoa Macedonia, FYR Guatemala Syrian Arab Rep. Sudan





Fiji Belarus Argentina Lebanon Botswana
Malaysia Bulgaria Belize Libya Gabon
Croatia Brazil Mauritius
Kazakhstan Chile Seychelles






St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
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Table A2. Cyclicality: Averages of Country-Level Correlation Coefficients between Pairs of 
Inflows and GDP, 1980-2007 
a. Simple average 
REM+FDI REM+ODA FDI+ODA
ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 0.57 0.39 0.42
East Asia and Pacific 0.53 0.37 0.35
Europe and Central Asia 0.72 0.60 0.61
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.70 0.56 0.55
Middle East and North Africa 0.45 0.14 0.27
South Asia 0.76 0.57 0.20
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.41 0.20 0.33
Low income 0.44 0.31 0.30
Lower middle income 0.61 0.45 0.41
Upper middle income 0.65 0.40 0.56  
b. GDP-weighted average 
REM+FDI REM+ODA FDI+ODA
ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 0.75 0.60 0.67
East Asia and Pacific 0.87 0.74 0.79
Europe and Central Asia 0.71 -0.02 0.67
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.75 0.82 0.68
Middle East and North Africa 0.34 0.01 0.24
South Asia 0.89 0.80 0.64
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.51 0.68 0.45
Low income 0.60 0.42 0.38
Lower middle income 0.83 0.70 0.72
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Table A3. Cyclicality: Percentage of Countries for which Capital Inflow A is Negatively 
Correlated with GDP, 1980-2007 
REM+FDI REM+ODA FDI+ODA
ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 116 12% 26% 16%
East Asia and Pacific 15 13% 33% 20%
Europe and Central Asia 20 5% 15% 5%
Latin America and the Caribbean 28 4% 14% 4%
Middle East and North Africa 10 20% 40% 30%
South Asia 6 0% 33% 33%
Sub-Saharan Africa 37 22% 32% 22%
low income 36 22% 28% 25%
lower middle income 45 11% 27% 18%
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Table A4. Cyclicality: Averages of Country-Level Correlation Coefficients between Inflows 
and GDP, 1980-2007, Hodrick-Prescott de-trending  
a. Simple average 
REM+FDI REM+ODA FDI+ODA
ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 0.15 0.05 0.10
East Asia and Pacific 0.17 0.06 0.09
Europe and Central Asia 0.18 0.20 0.16
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.15 -0.03 0.12
Middle East and North Africa 0.17 0.12 0.08
South Asia 0.11 -0.31 -0.03
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.13 0.06 0.08
Low income 0.09 0.01 0.07
Lower middle income 0.18 0.06 0.09
Upper middle income 0.17 0.08 0.15  
b. GDP-weighted average 
REM+FDI REM+ODA FDI+ODA
ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 0.29 0.11 0.28
East Asia and Pacific 0.57 0.30 0.53
Europe and Central Asia 0.28 0.29 0.21
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.16 -0.03 0.17
Middle East and North Africa 0.25 0.16 0.23
South Asia 0.18 -0.05 0.24
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.09 -0.13 0.08
Low income -0.04 -0.09 0.02
Lower middle income 0.43 0.22 0.41
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Table A5.  Cyclicality: Percentage of Countries for which Inflow A is Negatively Correlated 
with GDP, 1980-2007, Hodrick-Prescott de-trending 
REM+FDI REM+ODA FDI+ODA
ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 116 30% 36% 33%
East Asia and Pacific 15 40% 40% 40%
Europe and Central Asia 20 25% 15% 30%
Latin America and the Caribbean 28 25% 50% 29%
Middle East and North Africa 10 30% 30% 30%
South Asia 6 33% 67% 50%
Sub-Saharan Africa 37 32% 32% 32%
low income 36 36% 42% 33%
lower middle income 45 31% 36% 36%






Table A6.  Stabilizing Impact: Percentage of Countries for which Capital Inflow A is 
Stabilizing, 1980-2007* 
REM+FDI REM+ODA FDI+ODA
ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 116 19% 41% 32%
East Asia and Pacific 15 20% 33% 40%
Europe and Central Asia 20 5% 20% 15%
Latin America and the Caribbean 28 7% 29% 11%
Middle East and North Africa 10 40% 70% 30%
South Asia 6 33% 50% 50%
Sub-Saharan Africa 37 27% 57% 51%
low income 36 25% 50% 53%
lower middle income 45 20% 40% 27%
upper middle income 35 11% 34% 17%
Number of 
countries
A
 
* CV(A)<CV(GDP) 
 